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Investment necessary for growth is risky and often requires external ￿nancing. For
an emerging market, access to international credit markets is volatile and interest rates
re￿ ect risk of default. We present a theoretical model in which emerging market agents
have access to a pro￿table two-period investment project of ￿xed size greater than their
endowment. Credit market imperfections can magnify a small solvency problem into
a ￿nancial crisis with widespread default and/or currency devaluation. In equilibrium,
creditors o⁄er single-period debt up to a ceiling based on expected future output. News
about a negative productivity shock reduces the debt ceiling imposed by creditors,
creating a sudden stop of capital ￿ ows. The sudden stop can be severe enough to trigger
a debt crisis, when agents prefer default over debt repayment, and/or a currency crisis,
as agents attempt to maintain desired consumption by swapping domestic currency for
foreign currency to purchase goods. We also show that there are critical thresholds for
parameters governing credit market imperfections that separate countries into a safe
credit club with low interest rates and steady access and a risky club with high interest
rates and volatile access.
￿ Key Words: exchange rate crisis, ￿nancial crisis, debt crisis, twin crises, liquidity
crisis, solvency crisis, sudden stop, default, capital ￿ ight, foreign exchange reserves
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1 Introduction
Countries at di⁄erent stages of development experience substantial di⁄erences in credit mar-
ket characteristics. Underdeveloped countries have no access to credit; emerging markets
have access, but loans are relatively risky, with interest rates re￿ ecting that risk, and access
is volatile; developed countries have reliable access with low interest rates. The Asian ￿nan-
cial crises, characterized by high levels of non-performing loans and bankruptcies (Corsetti,
Pesenti and Roubini 1999) and high costs of recapitalizing the ￿nancial sector (Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Rebello 2001), drew attention to the volatile nature of emerging market
credit and the ￿nancial crises which can occur in these economies. A large quantity of lit-
erature has been devoted to understanding the cause of these crises with the objective of
developing policy to prevent future crises.
The literature attributes ￿nancial crises in emerging markets to three distinct causes. One
is ￿nancial market imperfections which create multiple equilibria. Calvo (1998) discusses the
implications of exogenous sudden stops of capital to emerging markets; Chang and Velasco
(2001) demonstrate how bank runs can cause a ￿nancial crisis and possibly a currency
crisis as well; and Chang (2007) shows how self-ful￿lling expectations can raise interest
rates, increasing debt and generating a crisis. What these papers and others like them have
in common is that ￿nancial market imperfections are responsible for multiple equilibria,
and a bad equilibrium is a crisis equilibrium. Crises are not generated by macroeconomic
1fundamentals.
Krugman (1998) and Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) o⁄er an alternative explana-
tion, attributing crises to the moral hazard caused by government bailout policy. Explicit
or implicit policy to guarantee foreign loans creates moral hazard and leads to ine¢ ciently
high risk-taking, raising crisis probability. Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2008) also
focus on the role of government bailouts in generating ￿nancial crises, but in their setup, the
interaction of bailout policy with capital market imperfections can lead to higher growth.
The bailout policy can correct ine¢ ciently high interest rates and low borrowing constraints.
Hence their model combines policy with capital market imperfections creating borrowing
constraints to show that ￿nancial crises could be a side-e⁄ect of policy chosen to stimulate
growth. These models cannot explain default unless anticipated bailouts do not materialize.
The third type of model focuses on shocks to relative prices in the presence of ￿nancial
market imperfections which create collateral constraints in borrowing.1 In these models, the
collateral constraint on loans is denominated in something other than the borrowing ￿rm￿ s
output, and the risk is that the price of collateral relative to the price of the ￿rm￿ s output
will fall. This would tighten the constraint and force the ￿rm to sell collateral in order
to repay the debt exceeding the tighter constraint. However, this sale further reduces the
collateral price, creating Fisherian debt-price de￿ ation. These models can explain sudden
stops of capital in￿ ows, current account reversals, and large relative price changes. They
cannot explain default or why some countries face risky and volatile credit while others have
1 See Radalet and Sachs (1999), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee
(2001), Chang and Velasco (2002), Arellano and Mendoza (2003), Mendoza and Smith (2006) models of
crises motivated by collateral constraints.
2safe loans and more stable access.
The purpose of this paper is to o⁄er a fourth type of emerging-market ￿nancial-crisis
model. We take seriously the idea that investment necessary for growth is risky. Business
cycle research views the downside of that risk as a recession. We present a model in which
￿nancial market imperfections, likely to characterize emerging markets, can amplify the ef-
fects of a negative productivity shock to generate a ￿nancial crisis. The model for emerging
market economies does not exhibit multiple equilibria, and in the absence of the negative
shock, there is no crisis. Therefore, crises are attributable to fundamentals. A crisis is char-
acterized by increasing interest rates and an endogenous sudden stop of capital. Depending
on policy, the negative productivity shock and sudden stop of capital can be accompanied by
widespread private default and/or a currency crisis. Hence, this model attributes emerging
market ￿nancial crises to the interaction of negative productivity shocks with the imperfect
￿nancial markets which characterize emerging economies. Policy does a⁄ect the severity of
the crisis, but there is no particular policy, like government bailouts, without which the crisis
would not occur. The model therefore does not place blame for ￿nancial crises on government
policy, but attributes them to the same productivity shocks which create business cycles.
Financial crises in emerging markets are complex a⁄airs, and undoubtedly all four types
of models are relevant. This paper ￿lls a gap by considering the implications of standard
productivity shocks, which are the cornerstone of business cycle analysis, for ￿nancial crises.
The ￿nancial market imperfections we consider are present in advanced economies, but
are less severe, as re￿ ected by di⁄erent parameter values. We show that these di⁄erent
3parameter values divide countries into credit clubs. Countries without access to technology,
with low wealth, or with weak domestic capital markets have no access to international credit
markets. Technology and a minimum level of initial resources, together with reasonably
strong domestic credit markets, give a country access, but that access is volatile and interest
rates carry default risk premia. A country acquires stable access to international credit with
risk-free loans once resources and the strength of domestic credit markets cross thresholds.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a description of the emerging
market economy. It includes a characterization of partial equilibrium in credit markets,
conditional on choices for debt, and ￿rst order conditions describing optimal behavior by the
domestic agent. Section 3 characterizes general equilibrium. Section 4 describes equilibrium
debt crises and currency crises. Section 5 considers government policy, and Section 6 contains
conclusions.
2 Model of a Small Emerging-Market Economy
2.1 Assumptions
The domestic economy is small and open. The world interest rate (r) is ￿xed, and foreign
creditors are risk-neutral. The world price of the single good is ￿xed and normalized at unity.
The single good rules out changes in a relative price or the real exchange rate as a cause for
crises in the model.2 Agents in the country have access to technology which provides them
with a risky investment opportunity with expected returns substantially greater than the
2 These changes undoubtedly occur and are emphasized in the collateral constraint models. We rule them
out here to focus on aggregate productivity shocks.
4world interest rate. There are three periods in the model, labeled 0; 1; and 2. Period 0 is
a planning period in which agents choose whether or not to undertake the risky investment
project. This decision a⁄ects the expected values of consumption in periods 1 and 2.
We assume that capital markets are subject to imperfections which are likely to exist in
emerging markets. We make assumptions about fundamental credit market imperfections
and use those to derive constraints and other imperfections which characterize capital mar-
kets in equilibrium. The fundamental imperfections are chosen to yield a particular set of
derivative ￿nancial market characteristics in equilibrium. These include international bor-
rowing to ￿nance risky investment, the possibility of default in equilibrium, credit ceilings
which are increasing both in the strength of domestic capital markets and in expectations of
future output, and maturity mismatch on loans and investments.
To generate external ￿nancing, we assume that agents in the emerging market have the
opportunity to undertake pro￿table investment, but that they do not have su¢ cient resources
to ￿nance a project without entering international ￿nancial markets. Resources include an
initial endowment of Y together with small government transfers ￿0 ￿ 0: Investment projects
are of ￿xed size, exceeding initial resources I > Y + ￿0: Agents can choose to allocate their
resources to the safe international bond (B0) as an alternative to investment. Agents choose
whether or not to invest with the objective of utility maximization. When they choose
investment, they must use external ￿nancing.
To generate ￿nancing with debt contracts subject to ceilings and the possibility of default
in equilibrium, we follow the costly state-veri￿cation literature and assume that agents cannot
5commit to repay and that information on the success or failure of the risky investment
project is private and accessible to the creditor only after payment of a state-veri￿cation
fee (Townsend 1979).3 The optimal contract minimizes payment of the state-veri￿cation fee
and has characteristics of a standard debt contract.4 Agents pay an amount agreed ex ante
in states for which this quantity is less than output and otherwise surrender output. When
agreed repayments, interpreted as debt with interest, are less than output, agents prefer to
repay, implying that there is no need to verify output. When output is less than the agreed
amount, agents are unable to pay, veri￿cation occurs, and agents surrender output. We
interpret failure to repay and surrender of output as bankruptcy with default. In equilibrium,
there is an upper bound on debt which creditors are willing to extend, assuring that agents
with high output have the incentive to repay.
The costly-state-veri￿cation model was originally introduced to model credit market im-
perfections in advanced economies. We modify the model in two ways to generate stronger
imperfections in emerging markets. To model credit market strength and generate respon-
siveness of loan ceilings to the strength of credit markets, we assume that bankruptcy courts
cannot award the entire output of a project in the event of a failure to repay. Instead, they
award a fraction ￿ < 1 of output, in contrast to ￿ = 1 for advanced economies. We inter-
pret a value for ￿ close to one as a relatively strong credit market, likely to characterize an
emerging market, while a very small ￿ would characterize an underdeveloped country. We
3 Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) present general equilibrium models with
asymmetric information and costly state veri￿cation in which shocks to ￿rm wealth a⁄ect the cost of investing,
thereby causing and propagating business cycles.
4 See Romer (1996) for a presentation of the model and its solution.
6show that the magnitude of the equilibrium credit ceiling is directly related to ￿, implying
that stronger credit markets enjoy larger credit ceilings relative to output.
The second modi￿cation is made to generate maturity mismatch in loans and investment
projects. We assume that agents must present evidence of investment plans before they can
receive a loan, eliminating any moral hazard with respect to investment. However, there is
moral hazard with respect to the choice of investment projects. Agents choose between a safe
one-period investment project and a two-period project with higher expected returns. The
safe one-period project yields a ￿xed quantity of output in period 1 (Y s
1 > (1 + r)(I ￿ Y ))
and no output in period 2. The risky two-period project yields a small ￿xed quantity of
output in period 1 (Y1), and ￿nal output of HI for agents of type h; and LI for agents of
type l in period 2. Agents do not know their type until period 2 when output of the risky
project is revealed. The fraction of agents with high productivity (￿) is stochastic with a
lower bound of ￿l: We assume that LI is small relative to HI and represents scrap value
of the project. Each project requires the agent￿ s full labor endowment, implying that he
can choose only one. We assume that expected output from the risky two-period project is
su¢ ciently greater than output from the safe one-period project that agents who expect to
honor debt contracts prefer the risky project.5
5 We need speci￿c assumptions about magnitudes for later proofs. The second-period output of the invest-
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We elaborate further on magnitude restrictions in the appendix after we solve for equilibrium values.
7However, if an agent could ￿nance the one-period project with a two-period loan, he
could completely escape debt obligations since there would be no period-2 output to support
repayment when the loan matures. When utility with period-1 income of Y s
1 exceeds utility
with expected income from the risky project, the agent plans to ￿nance the single-period
project with a two-period loan and walk away. The moral hazard problem can be solved with
single-period debt contracts. If agents use single-period loans to ￿nance the safe one-period
project and fail to repay, creditors can claim ￿Y s
1 ; leaving agents with income of Y s
1 (1 ￿ ￿).6
Under the assumption that utility with income of Y s
1 (1 ￿ ￿) is less than expected utility with
income from the risky two-period project, the moral hazard problem is solved when creditors
o⁄er only single-period loans. Agents choose the risky investment project in equilibrium.
We generate sudden stops in this environment by assuming that in period 1, the market
receives a signal on the number, but not the identity of type h￿agents, given by ￿.7 To
simplify, we assume that the signal is perfect such that aggregate uncertainty is resolved in
period 1. We show that in equilibrium, the endogenous credit ceiling for new loans depends
on the number of productive agents. A low number of productive agents yields a low credit
ceiling, which we interpret as a sudden stop of capital ￿ ows. Agents, facing a sudden stop
of capital ￿ ows, choose whether or not to repay or default on initial loans.
To permit an exchange rate crisis, we introduce a government which is responsible for
money (M) and monetary policy. The government sells money to the private sector and uses
the proceeds to buy foreign exchange reserves. It also makes monetary transfers (￿0 ￿ 0):
6 Since agents must provide credible evidence of investment plans for each single-period loan, the creditor
who is not approached for a new loan by the defaulting client, will claim the bankruptcy settlement.
7 Think of this as general information on the state of the economy.
8Money, backed by foreign exchange reserves, can serve as a hedge asset to support consump-
tion in the event of a sudden stop of capital ￿ ows. To allow a currency crisis to accompany
a sudden stop of capital in the model, we make assumptions which assure that, in an equi-
librium with risky investment, agents choose domestic money as the hedge asset. Following
Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1996), we assume that all international bonds would be con￿scated in
the event of bankruptcy, and that the holding cost of foreign currency is prohibitively high,
such that agents do not choose to hold foreign currency.8 Additionally, we assume that the
government has a ￿xed-price-level target and maintains a ￿xed exchange rate system until
its reserves are exhausted, allowing interpretation of depreciation as a failure of the ￿xed ex-
change rate. These assumptions, restricting possible hedge assets and ￿xing exchange rates,
are not necessary to generate sudden stops of capital with the possibility of default, but they
are necessary to introduce the possibility of a currency crisis accompanying a sudden stop.
The introduction of money requires some assumption about the denomination of the
private debt contracts (Dt). If debt contracts were denominated in domestic currency, then
the domestic government could completely in￿ ate away their residents￿debt, implying that
international creditors could not expect to receive the market rate of return. Since the
government has no way to commit not to in￿ ate, especially in a bad state, in equilibrium
debt will be denominated in foreign currency.
8 The government can hold interest-bearing foreign bonds as foreign exchange reserves, and these are not
con￿scated in the event of private default. Therefore, it is optimal for agents to hold domestic money,
backed by interest-bearing international bonds, instead of foreign currency, justifying the imposition of
prohibitively high holding costs. These could be something like failure to provide implicit or explicit backing
for domestically-held foreign-currency deposits or rules which prevent banks from accepting foreign-currency
deposits from domestic residents.
9There is no role for government spending in the model, so we assume that spending is
zero. Additionally, since the model is about private debt, not government debt, we assume
that the government cannot borrow internationally, implying that there is no sovereign debt.
And, ￿nally, since productivity across agents di⁄ers and the model is not about risk-sharing
across agents, we assume that the government redistributes income using the tax system in
period 2 (￿2) to achieve perfect risk-sharing across agents.9
Agents maximize expected utility, which depends on consumption and real money bal-
ances in periods 1 and 2. Since agents are identical until the ￿nal period, they make the
same decisions in periods 0 and 1. Assuming that agents have unit mass, expected utility













where P2 = P0 since the government can set period-2 taxes to achieve its ￿xed-price target in
any state. In equation (1), ￿ is the discount factor, assumed to equal the inverse of the world
gross interest rate (￿ = (1 + r)￿1); ￿; restricted by 0 < ￿ < r
1+r; is a ￿xed parameter, f (￿)
is the density function for the number of high-productivity agents, c denotes consumption,
subscripts 1 and 2 denote periods, and subscripts h and l denote the high-productivity and
low-productivity agent respectively.
9 This requires that the government can learn the identity of agents without paying the state-veri￿cation
fee.
10It is convenient to represent a time line for the economy as follows
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
receive transfers (￿0) learn ￿ and debt ceiling realize output, agents learn identity
choose investment project receive transfers (￿1) creditors pay veri￿cation fees
choose
M0
P0 ; implying D0 choose to repay or default l-agents default and pay ￿LI
choose M1 and c1 h-agents pay min[￿HI; (1 + r1)D1]
currency crisis realized or not consume, c2, and pay taxes ￿2 < 0
2.2 Partial Equilibrium in International Credit Markets
This section characterizes a partial equilibrium in an emerging market economy, in which two-
period risky investment projects are ￿nanced by single-period international loans, provided
by risk-neutral foreign creditors. We de￿ne an emerging economy as one which needs external
￿nancing for investment and for which ￿ is less than unity, but not too small, as quanti￿ed
below. Conditional on the agent￿ s choice of values for D0 and D1; we solve for equilibrium
values of the interest rates. The interest rate is the price at which risk-neutral international
creditors would be willing to supply di⁄erent quantities of loans. We show that when D0
and D1 exceed certain values, there is no equilibrium, implying upper bounds. In the general
equilibrium, de￿ned subsequently, the agent￿ s choice for debt is endogenous and depends on
the interests rates required for di⁄erent quantities of debt.
A partial equilibrium in credit markets is de￿ned for given values of D0 and D1, as
interest rates in each period, fr0; r1g and debt ceilings in each period
￿ ￿ D0; ￿ D1
￿
such that
risk-neutral international creditors willingly provide loans when they expect to receive the
11risk-free interest rate, and consumers choose between repayment or surrender of bankruptcy
awards in order to maximize utility.
2.2.1 Period-1 Debt
Working backwards, consider the equilibrium values for the debt ceiling and interest rate
in period 1. At the beginning of period 1, the market receives a signal on the number of
productive agents (￿); but agents do not learn their own identity. We interpret failure to
repay contractual debt with interest as default. As in the costly-state-veri￿cation literature,
agents with low productivity, l-agents, will default on their period-1 debt (D1) in period 2
since their debt obligations exceed the bankruptcy settlement. Creditors o⁄er new period-1
debt (D1) up to a ceiling at which debt repayments equal the compensation h￿agents must
pay creditors in the event of default. This assures that h￿agents have the incentive to repay
in period 2, and implies a ceiling on period-1 debt given by
(1 + r1)D1 ￿ (1 + r1) ￿ D1 = ￿HI; (2)
where ￿ D1 is the ceiling on period-1 debt.
The equilibrium interest rate on period-1 debt depends on the realization of ￿. Assuming
that loans to the emerging economy￿ s agents can be pooled to yield a risk-free asset, arbitrage
requires that the period-1 interest rate equate the payments from loans to agents in the
emerging market with the payments on the same loans in the risk-free international market.
Given the debt ceiling, the ￿ agents of type h always pay 1+r1 on D1, and the 1￿￿ agents of
type l pay ￿LI after the international creditor pays the state-veri￿cation fee of $. Therefore,
12arbitrage requires
(1 + r)D1 = ￿(1 + r1)D1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿LI ￿ $):
Simplifying by assuming that ￿LI = $; the period 1 gross interest rate is given by




A bad signal about the number of productive agents, represented by a low value for ￿;
raises interest rates because only agents of type h will repay. Therefore, interest rates are
rising as the fraction of h￿agents, given by ￿; falls.
Equations (2) and (3) can be solved for the period-1 debt ceiling
￿ ￿ D1
￿
to show that it is
increasing in both in the number of productive agents (￿) and in the fraction of output that





A low realization for ￿ implies a low debt ceiling and has the interpretation of capital ￿ ight.
The assumption that ￿ is relatively large in emerging markets is interpreted as requiring
that ￿ be large enough that the debt ceiling is increasing in ￿ faster than desired debt. This
implies that the debt ceiling is more likely to bind for a low realization of ￿:
Now, consider the agent￿ s default decision in period 1, on debt taken out in period 0,
D0; after information on ￿ is revealed. Let D1 represent the agent￿ s choice for period-
1 debt. When D1 is less than the debt ceiling
￿ ￿ D1
￿
; default is not an issue. This is
because for D1 ￿ (1 + r0)D0, the agent can repay existing loans with new loans, and for
13D1 < (1 + r0)D0; the agent reduces his debt by repaying it. When debt is constrained by
the ceiling and ￿ D1 ￿ (1 + r0)D0; the agent can still repay with new loans, implying that
he does not default.10 However, when ￿ D1 < (1 + r0)D0; default becomes a possibility. The
agent chooses between default and repayment to maximize utility, conditional on bankruptcy
awards.
These awards depend on the creditor￿ s reaction to the agent￿ s failure to repay. The cred-
itor has two choices. He could claim bankruptcy awards in period 1 of ￿Y1. Alternatively, he
could roll over the loan, e⁄ectively o⁄ering the agent period-1 debt equal to (1 + r0)D0 > ￿ D1:
This would give the agent a period-2 choice of repaying (1 + r1)(1 + r0)D0; or surrendering
￿HI; if he is an h￿agent, or ￿LI; if he is an l￿agent. Since bankruptcy awards would be less
than debt with interest (since debt exceeds the ceiling), both types of agents would declare
bankruptcy in period 2. Since awards are conditional on output, the international creditor
would verify output and pay state veri￿cation fees. Given the assumption that $ = ￿LI;
the present value of the net bankruptcy awards to the creditor from rolling over debt is given
by
￿￿(HI￿LI)
1+r ; and the net value of immediate bankruptcy awards is ￿ (Y1 ￿ LI): Given the
assumption above that HI is large relative to Y1, the creditor prefers to roll over the loan,
rescheduling debt in response to the default.11
Lemma 1 Given initial debt with interest, (1 + r0)D0; there is a critical value of ￿ = ￿d;
below which agents choose default and above which agents choose repayment.
10Even if he did not repay, the creditor would reduce net new loans so that they did not exceed the debt
ceiling, and there would be no other consequences.
11Recall that if there were any agents who chose a single-period project, these agents would have no invest-
ment project, thereby revealing their identity. The creditor would treat these agents di⁄erently, claiming
bankruptcy awards of ￿Y s
1 instead of rolling over the loan. Given that agents know the creditor will do
this, they prefer the two-period investment project, and no agents will choose the single-period project in
equilibrium.
14Proof. Let the realization for ￿ be large such that
￿￿HI
1+r > (1 + r0)D0: Agents use new
debt to repay old, and default has no meaning. Let the realization for ￿ be small such that
￿￿HI
1+r < (1 + r0)D0: Default in period 1 does not a⁄ect the expected value of debt repayments
in period 2 because both agents will default and surrender ￿ of output. Default increases
current resources since debt repayments exceed the current debt ceiling. With constrained
debt, current resources are more valuable than future resources for consumption smoothing.
Agents prefer default.
Therefore, agents default when the upper bound on period-1 debt, given by
￿￿HI
1+r from
equation (4), is less than repayment of principle and interest on initial debt. In equilibrium,
for a given value of (1 + r0)D0; the critical value of ￿ below which agents default in period










When ￿d takes on the value of its lower support, given by ￿l; there is no value of ￿ for which
agents would default, and loans are perfectly safe.





, above which debt








When D0 ￿ DR
0 ; substituting into equation (5) yields ￿d = ￿l, implying that debt is perfectly
safe since no value for ￿ could elicit default.
152.2.2 Initial-Period Debt
Now, consider the equilibrium interest rate on loans made in period 0 (D0), when there is
uncertainty regarding ￿. If agents choose default in period 1, creditors claim ￿ of second
period output at the cost of the veri￿cation fee of $: Given risk-neutral creditors, the value
of expected debt repayments on the risky loan must equal the value of debt repayments
on a safe international loan. With the simplifying assumption that ￿LI = $; the period-0
interest rate must satisfy











where the ￿rst integral represents the probability that agents repay in period 1 and the
second represents the expected present value of net repayments in period 2, arising from
default and rescheduling in period 1. Solving for contractual debt repayments [(1 + r0)D0]
as a function of D0 and ￿d yields
(1 + r0)D0 =











Equations (5) and (7) constitute a pair of non-linear equations which can be used to
determine equilibrium values for r0 and ￿d for a given value of initial debt, D0: Linearization
would distort a central feature of the equilibrium, which we want to emphasize, and we
therefore characterize the solution graphically.12











In Figure 1, the curve labeled ￿d plots the equilibrium relationship between the value of
￿ which elicits default, given by ￿d; and contractual debt obligations, given by (1 + r0)D0;
from equation (5). Since ￿l is the lower support of the distribution, there is a range of values
for (1 + r0)D0 for which no value of ￿ would elicit default, implying that for low contractual
debt obligations, ￿d is vertical at ￿l: As (1 + r0)D0 increases, equation (5) implies a positive
linear relationship between (1 + r0)D0 and ￿d:
The curves labeled AA plot the arbitrage relationship in equation (7) between ￿d and
(1 + r0)D0; for di⁄erent values of period-0 debt (D0). For values of ￿d ￿ ￿l, there is no
risk of default and the interest rate equals the world rate, implying that the AA curves
have intercepts at (1 + r)D0 and that they are horizontal for ￿d ￿ ￿l: Higher initial debt
is represented by curves with higher intercepts. For ￿d > ￿l; equation (7) implies that
(1 + r0)D0 rises at an increasing rate as ￿d rises, requiring that the AA curves have an
increasing slope.
17The ￿rst intersection of a particular AA curve with the ￿d curve is a stable equilibrium
and gives the equilibrium values for ￿d and r0 for a given value of D0: The curve labeled AAS
is drawn for a low value of initial debt (D0S). It intersects the ￿d curve along the vertical
portion, implying that this level of debt is perfectly safe, hence the subscript S for safe. An
increase in D0 shifts the AA curve upwards. If the increase is large enough that the AA
curve no longer intersects the ￿d curve along the vertical portion, then this level of debt is
risky. Both r0 and ￿d rise until the values of (1 + r0)D0 and ￿d are given by the intersection
of the AA and ￿d curves for the new level of D0:
Note that there is a value for initial debt, given by ￿ D0; such that for D0 > ￿ D0; there is no
equilibrium. This establishes the upper bound on D0 as the largest value for D0 such that
a solution to the equations (5) and (7) exists. Equivalently, ￿ D0 is the value of D0; which
yields a tangency between the two curves. The value of ￿d for D0 = ￿ D0 is labeled ￿ ￿d; and
represents the largest feasible value for ￿d:
An increase in the proportion of output awarded in bankruptcy, given by ￿; ￿ attens the
AA curve and increases the slope of the ￿d curve, implying that the tangency occurs for a
higher value of debt. Stronger credit markets are associated with higher debt ceilings.
Totally di⁄erentiating equations (5) and (7) with respect to ￿d, r0; and D0; for ￿d > ￿l;
yields the equilibrium relationship between ￿d and D0, allowing the interest rate to adjust,
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￿d f (￿)d￿ ￿ ￿d￿LIf (￿d)
i > 0 D0 < ￿ D0: (9)
The signs re￿ ect the choice of the stable equilibrium at the lower value of ￿d; together with
assumption that H is large relative to L so that the denominator is positive at ￿d = ￿l. As
￿d rises (in response to the increase in D0), the value of the denominator shrinks, eventually
reaching zero as D0 reaches ￿ D0, with ￿d reaching ￿ ￿d: Equilibrium values for ￿d and r0 are
rising in D0 at increasing rates, with the rate of increase reaching in￿nity at upper bounds.
To summarize, the resulting equilibrium in credit markets has characteristics of credit
markets in emerging economies. Creditors o⁄er single-period debt contracts to ￿nance longer-
term investment, yielding maturity mismatch. Equilibrium interest rates are increasing in
the magnitude of the loan. Creditors impose endogenous credit ceilings, conditional on
awards they would receive in bankruptcy court in the event of default. The period-1 credit
market can be characterized by binding debt ceilings which ￿ uctuate with news, yielding
sudden stops in the event of bad news. In contrast to the costly state-veri￿cation models of
developed economies (Bernanke and Gertler 1989 and Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997), in which
shocks primarily a⁄ect the demand for loans and investment by a⁄ecting costs, shocks a⁄ect
the availability of credit.
2.3 Budget Constraints
2.3.1 Period 0
In period 0, the government sells nominal money to agents and issues monetary transfers
(￿0): Goods and foreign exchange, received in exchange for money net of transfers, are used
19to buy the international bond for use as foreign exchange reserves (F0). The government￿ s




￿ ￿0 > 0: (10)
The assumptions that the government maintains ￿xed exchange rates in good states and that
it cannot borrow on foreign markets requires that initial transfers are small enough to assure
F0 > 0. Note that ￿0 = 0 implies that money is completely backed by foreign exchange
reserves, as with a currency board.
In period 0 agents receive an endowment (Y ) and exogenous government transfers (￿0).
They use these together with new debt (D0) to ￿nance the investment project (I) and to





and the safe international bond (B0).13




Given that international bonds would be con￿scated in the event of default, that investment
is relatively more pro￿table than the safe international bond, and that the agent must borrow
at a risk-adjusted interest rate if he chooses to invest, an equilibrium with investment implies
that the agent chooses B0 = 0:
Consider the e⁄ect of the upper bound on debt for an agent￿ s access to international
credit. Equation (11) with B0 = 0 together with the upper bound on debt implies that in
an equilibrium with investment
D0 = I ￿ Y +
M0
P0
￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ D0: (12)
13The assumption that holding costs of foreign currency are prohibitively high implies that agents do not
hold foreign currency.
20Proposition 1 A country with I ￿ Y ￿ ￿ D0 does not have access to international ￿nancial
markets.
Proof. Equations (11) and (10), together with assumptions, yielding F0 > 0; imply that a
country with I ￿ Y ￿ ￿ D0 would require D0 > ￿ D0:
Therefore, countries with too few resources relative to the size of investment projects ￿nd
that they cannot access credit markets. Very poor countries cannot borrow enough to engage
in risky investment projects because the risk of default would be too high. Additionally, since
￿ D0 is increasing in ￿, a stronger credit market can allow access for a given value of I ￿ Y:
2.3.2 Period 1
In period 1, the government receives interest (r) on foreign exchange reserves and distributes
the interest to agents as transfer payments (￿1 = rF0). Additionally, the government buys
domestic currency using foreign exchange reserves at the pegged exchange rate up until the
















The max is necessary because foreign exchange reserves are constrained to be non-negative.
That is, the government￿ s reserves evolve according to the ￿rst term in equation (13) as
long as F1 ￿ 0: The second equality comes from using the government￿ s period-0 budget
constraint to substitute for
M0
P0 . Once reserves are exhausted, the government is no longer
able to buy money in exchange for foreign exchange reserves, limiting the possible reduction
in the quantity of money. This implies that
M1
P0 has a lower bound at ￿0; where F1 = 0: If
foreign exchange reserves are exhausted in period 1, then the price level and the exchange
21rate become endogenous.
Now, consider the period-1 budget constraint for the agent. In period 1, a value for ￿
is realized, but agents do not learn their own identity. When
￿￿HI
1+r ￿ (1 + r0)D0; agents
can increase debt and use these resources, together with period-1 output (Y1); government













1+r < (1 + r0)D0; Lemma (1) states
that the agent defaults. In response, the international creditor rolls over the loan so that
D1 = (1 + r0)D0; implying no change in the agent￿ s outstanding debt.
Since all agents are alike in period 1, they cannot increase aggregate consumption above
current output without exchanging domestic money for foreign exchange and purchasing
foreign goods. Each agent is allowed to exchange money balances for foreign exchange up
until the point at which authorities exhaust their foreign exchange reserves. When there
are insu¢ cient reserves, we assume that agents each receive an equal per capita share of
foreign exchange reserves. The agent acts as though any additional transactions, exceeding
the agent￿ s share of foreign exchange reserves, must be carried out at the new equilibrium
price level (P1).14
Letting ￿ be an indicator function, which takes on the value of unity in the absence of
14Agents face two prices in period 1 when the ￿xed exchange rate fails. To the extent that agents can
exchange domestic money for foreign exchange at the ￿xed exchange rate of P0, they can use the proceeds of
the exchange to buy goods for P0￿P￿;where P￿ = 1 is the foreign-currency price of goods. To the extent that
they cannot get as much foreign currency as they want goods, agents act as though other transactions must
be made at the new equilibrium price of P1: However, since all agents are alike, there are no agents willing to
trade goods for money. We show below that the higher price is necessary in equilibrium to convince agents
to postpone consumption.
22default and zero otherwise, the agent￿ s period-1 budget constraint is given by15













The government does not carry reserves forward in the ￿nal period because the reserves would
have no value. Therefore, the government uses any remaining foreign exchange reserves
together with period-2 taxes (￿￿2) to buy the remaining money supply at P2 = P0: The
period-2 budget constraint is given by








￿ (1 + r)￿0: (16)
In period 2, the h￿agent receives output of HI: He pays the minimum of ￿HI and
(1 + r1)D1 to international creditors. If he defaulted in period 1, e⁄ectively forcing in-
ternational creditors to roll over period-0 debt, then bankruptcy awards are smaller than
debt obligations. He uses resources, net of debt repayments or bankruptcy awards, together
with money to consume and to pay taxes, based on his income (￿2h): His period-2 budget
constraint is given by




15The agent could choose to buy international bonds, but he will not do so in equilibrium since this would
require additional borrowing at a risk-adjusted interest rate and since international bonds have no hedge
value in period 1. He will not hold foreign currency since it yields no utility and has high holding costs.
23The l￿agent defaults in period 2 because his debt exceeds liabilities assessed by the
bankruptcy court. Therefore, he receives output LI and pays ￿LI to international creditors.
He uses these net resources together with money to consume and to pay taxes (￿2l), based
on his income. His budget constraint is given by




Agents understand that the government chooses income-speci￿c tax and transfer rates to
equalize income net of debt repayments across agents subject to a constraint that aggregate
transfers satisfy
￿￿2h + (1 ￿ ￿)￿2l = ￿2:
This implies that period-2 budget constraints for agents are equivalent and are given by




2.4 First Order Conditions
In making decisions, agents take taxes, foreign exchange reserves, interest rates, and prices
as given. The problem is solved backwards, beginning with choices made in period 1.
In period 1, uncertainty about the number of h￿agents is resolved with a realization of
￿; but agents do not learn their own identity. They choose period-1 debt (D1), period-1





, and whether or not to default, ￿ 2 f0;1g; to maximize





, subject to budget constraints
given by (14) and (19) and the inequality constraint, given by equation (2).
24Consider the agent￿ s choice for ￿rst-period debt in the case in which he chooses to repay
period-0 debt in period 1 (￿ = 1); giving him the right to increase debt at the period-1
interest rate. The Euler equation has an inequality depending on whether or not the debt







￿ (1 + r)
c2
; (20)
where the equality uses equation (3) to substitute for (1 + r1): Given the assumption that
￿ = (1 + r)
￿1 ; equation (20) implies that, when the debt ceiling does not bind, agents
choose equal consumption across periods. Otherwise, second-period consumption exceeds
￿rst period consumption with debt given by the ceiling in equation (4).






is chosen to maximize utility, given by equation (1) with known ￿; subject to the budget












When the Euler equation (20) holds with equality, the money demand function reduces











where P0 is the price level in period 2, giving (1 + r)
P0
P1 the interpretation of the gross nominal
interest rate. When agents cannot smooth consumption using debt, so that equation (20)
holds with inequality (c2 > c1), they can still obtain some consumption-smoothing using
25real money balances. When
P0
P1 = 1, agents could reduce
M1
P0 by a large enough amount to
raise c1 and reduce c2 until they are equal, but they will not choose to do this. Money
directly yields utility, and the utility value of complete consumption smoothing is not large
enough for agents to sacri￿ce the utility from real money balances required for complete
consumption smoothing. Note that real money balances are lower the larger the di⁄erence
in consumption across periods because agents do sacri￿ce some utility from money to gain
utility from consumption-smoothing.






implying a desired level of initial debt, D0; subject to the
upper bound ￿ D0. In choosing initial money, he takes interest rates, prices, and government
transfers from foreign exchange reserves as given. He also considers how initial money will
a⁄ect future choices which determine expected utility from consumption and money balances
over the next two periods. The ￿rst-order condition on
M0










































where equation (11) determines
￿ M0
P0
= ￿ m0 = ￿ D0 ￿ I + Y + ￿0: (24)
The net marginal cost of holding money is the negative of the ￿rst term in equation (22).
It represents the consumption value of the cost of the increase in debt necessary to hold the
16Note that the coe¢ cient on the partial derivatives of M1
P0 and D1 with respect to M0
P0 are zero by ￿rst order
conditions, given by equations (21) and (20) respectively.
26additional money, integrated over all values of ￿: For states in which debt is repaid (￿ = 1),







; which is approximately the consumption
value of the nominal interest rate. For states in which debt is not repaid (￿ = 0); the net
marginal cost is ￿
P0
P1c1; indicating that holding additional money yields bene￿ts only since
money is used to increase consumption at the period-1 price level and debt issued to acquire
money is not repaid. The net marginal cost is the integral of these marginal costs over all
states. The marginal bene￿t of additional money is the utility value of money, given by
the last term. The inequality re￿ ects the presence of the upper bound on debt implying an
upper bound on money.
When parameters take on values for which there is no probability of either default or
currency crisis in equilibrium, ￿d = ￿l; and ￿ = 1 and P0 = P1 in all states, simplifying the












We consider an equilibrium for parameter values such that agents choose the risky two-
period investment project. Given government policy, including values for ￿0 and ￿; the
distribution of ￿; and a realization for ￿ in period 1, equilibrium is de￿ned as the set of
values for consumption and real money balances in each period, foreign exchange reserves









P1;r0, r1, ￿ D0; ￿ D1; F0; F1; ￿2; ￿d
o
; for which arbitrage conditions on
interest rates (equations 3 and 7) and the period-1 debt ceiling (equation 4) are satis￿ed,
government budget constraints hold with positive period-0 foreign exchange reserves and non-
negative period-1 reserves (equations 10, 13, and 15), agent budget constraints (equations 14
and 19) and ￿rst order conditions (equations 20, 21, 22, and 23)) hold, agents choose default
optimally (equation 5), and expectations are rational.
3.2 Equilibrium Debt and Interest Rates
Equations (5) and (7) allow characterization of (1 + r0)D0 and ￿d as a function of the agent￿ s
choice for D0: These equations also imply an upper bound on initial debt. In this section,
we characterize the general equilibrium by solving for the agent￿ s choice for initial debt, D0:
Consider the demand for initial debt in a country for which ￿ D0 > I ￿ Y ￿ ￿0 > 0. Given
that we are focusing on an equilibrium in which agents choose the risky investment project,
they must borrow at least I ￿ Y ￿ ￿0: Given that money yields utility, they will choose to
borrow more to hold real money balances. Hence we focus on the demand for initial real
money as the determinant of D0. This is given by the solution to equations (22) and (23).
The objective is to characterize money demand, and hence D0; as a function of the
interest rate (r0) and the critical value of ￿ eliciting default
￿
￿d￿
. Using equation (22), Figure




























allowing values for ￿d and r0 to change according to equations (8) and (9), with
dm0
dD0 = 1:
28Advanced Economy Emerging Economy







Figure 2: Equilibrium Initial Money
m0
Marginal bene￿ts of money, de￿ned as the additional utility of holding additional money
and labeled MB, are independent of r0 and ￿d. Given assumptions on the utility function,
marginal bene￿ts are falling at a decreasing rate as real money increases. Marginal bene￿ts
are drawn as identical in both panels of Figure 2.
The marginal cost of money is the opportunity cost of holding money. Simplifying by













with ￿d given by equation (5). For low levels of m0; D0 is low and the results above imply
that r0 = r and ￿d = ￿l: Small increases in money keep D0 low enough that r0 and ￿d do not
change from their risk-free values. Agents incur the interest rate as the opportunity cost of
holding additional money, but they receive this back in equilibrium as lump-sum transfers of
17We show below that this is su¢ cient to ￿x prices in all states. The implications allowing ￿0 > 0, are not
very di⁄erent as long as the government maintains a ￿xed exchange rate in good states as assumed. This
prevents relative prices from moving too far from unity even in bad states.
29interest earnings on foreign exchange reserves, keeping the value of equilibrium consumption
constant. Therefore, for low values of m0, the second term in equation (26) is zero, and
marginal cost is positive and constant as m0 increases.
As m0 continues to increase, D0 reaches a critical value, given by DR
0 in equation (6),
at which r0 and ￿d increase. When m0 takes on a value such that D0 = DR
0 , marginal












0 is increasing in the strength of credit markets (￿);
marginal costs fall at a lower value of debt (and money) for the emerging economy than for
the advanced economy.
For values of initial money such that DR
0 < D0 < ￿ D0, increases in m0 cause both r0 and
￿d to rise at increasing rates. The increase in r0 and the adjustment of c1 to increasing m0
increase the marginal cost of money in states for which ￿ > ￿d: The increase in ￿d replaces
states in which agents repay and incur positive marginal cost of money with states in which
agents default and incur negative marginal costs, reducing marginal costs. We argue in
the appendix that in this range, the marginal cost of money is falling in m0 for reasonable
parameter values.
The rate of change of marginal costs reaches negative in￿nity at the value for m0 for
which
d￿d
dD0 ! 1; equivalently at the upper bound on m0: In Figure 2, the upper bound
on money, labeled ￿ m0; is drawn as occurring at a lower value for m0 in the panel labeled
"Emerging Economy" than in the panel labeled "Advanced Economy". The upper bound
on money for an advanced economy is higher because that economy has higher income, and
30therefore less need to borrow for investment, and a stronger credit market, re￿ ected by a
larger ￿:
To summarize, MC is initially ￿ at in m0: At the critical value of m0 at which debt becomes
risky, marginal costs begin falling, and the rate of change of marginal costs reaches negative
in￿nity at m0 = ￿ m0:
Equilibrium real money must satisfy equations (22) and (23). This requires either that
net marginal costs equal marginal bene￿ts at a value of money less than the maximum or
that marginal bene￿ts be greater than or equal to marginal costs at the maximum. Since
the rate of change of net marginal costs approaches negative in￿nity at the upper bound,
there is always an equilibrium at the upper bound. This equilibrium has maximum risk.
If there is a safe equilibrium, then net marginal cost computed at the risk-free interest
rate, must intersect marginal bene￿t before m0 gets large enough to cause ￿d to rise above
￿l: A safe equilibrium is given by D0S in Figure 1 and m0S in the ￿rst panel of Figure 2.
For the emerging market, only the risky equilibrium at ￿ m0 exists. Note that both the safe
equilibrium and the risky one are locally stable since agents reduce (increase) real money
when net marginal costs exceed (are less than) marginal bene￿ts.
Therefore, advanced economies exhibit multiple equilibria, where one is safe and the other
has maximum risk, while emerging markets have only the equilibrium with maximum risk.
If we assume that in normal times, agents coordinate on the safe equilibrium for advanced
economies, then the following proposition holds.
Allowing ￿0 to be small, but positive, does not change the thrust of this result. We show
31below that when ￿0 > 0; an increase in m0 has no e⁄ect on
P0
P1 unless foreign exchange reserves
in period 1 are exhausted in some states. For small m0, F0 is small implying that foreign
exchange reserves could be exhausted in some states. As m0 increases, F0 increases reducing
the number of states in which foreign exchange reserves will be exhausted and reducing the
magnitude of the fall in
P0
P1 for those states in which foreign exchange reserves are exhausted.
From equation (22), this increases the marginal bene￿ts of money and reduces net marginal
costs. The assumption that ￿0 is small is taken to imply that the slopes do not change much
so that the slope of MB is less than the slope of MC for small values of m0: When ￿0 > 0,
we will show below that the safe equilibrium, when it exists, is without default risk, but not
without exchange rate risk.
Proposition 2 Assume that agents coordinate on the safe equilibrium when it exists. Given
values for ￿, H; L; and I; there is a critical value of Y + ￿0, above which equilibrium debt
is low enough that countries have no risk of widespread default and below which equilibrium
debt is driven to its upper bound
￿ ￿ D0
￿
such that risk takes on its maximum value. This
divides countries into two groups, a safe group and a risky group. A country with a stronger
credit market, represented by a larger value for ￿; has a lower critical value.






0 ￿ (I ￿ Y ￿ ￿0) =
￿l￿HI
(1 + r)
2 ￿ I + Y + ￿0:
A safe equilibrium exists if MB intersects MC at a value of m0 ￿ mR
0 : Otherwise, debt is
driven to its upper bound with maximum risk
￿ ￿ D0
￿
. The critical value of money is increasing
in both Y + ￿0 and ￿: Given a value for ￿; this implies a critical value for Y + ￿0 such that
for values above the critical value, debt is perfectly safe in equilibrium.
32Note that this proposition implies that there are no countries which are a "little" risky.
A country which would have a small probability of default at the risk-free interest rate has
the incentive to borrow to hold money as a precaution against a default state. The increase
in debt increases both the probability of default and the interest rate, giving him incentives
to hold even more money. This in turn increases the interest rate and the probability of
default until values are driven to their upper bounds. Additionally, stronger credit markets,
represented by a higher value for ￿; have a higher critical value for I ￿ Y ￿ ￿0; implying
that di⁄erences in credit markets contribute to determination of whether a country belongs
in the safe club or the risky club.
We should note that we cannot rule out the possibility of the risky equilibrium for ad-
vanced economies. There could be turbulent times where agents coordinate on the risky




Under the assumption that markets coordinate on the safe equilibrium when it exists, a
country has risk of a debt crisis if values of Y + ￿0 and ￿ are low relative to an advanced
country, so that the safe equilibrium does not exist, but high relative to an underdeveloped
country so that creditors are willing to lend.
Proposition 3 In period 1, a value for ￿ < ￿ ￿d triggers a debt crisis in which all agents
choose not to repay debt.
33Proof. Proposition 2 implies that debt is driven to its upper bound, driving ￿d to ￿ ￿d. When
the stochastic realization of ￿ < ￿d = ￿ ￿d, agents default by Lemma 1.
In equilibrium, international creditors impose a ceiling on period-1 debt, given by
￿￿HI
1+r ;
to assure that they receive the expected risk-free rate of return. A small realization for ￿
implies a low credit ceiling and has the interpretation of capital ￿ ight. The sudden stop in
capital ￿ ows, created by a small number of h￿agents, implies that agents could be better o⁄
defaulting on their debt. Agents choose to default on their debt whenever the realization for
￿ < ￿d = ￿ ￿d; such that debt repayments would exceed new loans available. Agents do face
consequences for their default decision in period 2, when they must surrender bankruptcy
awards based on realized output.
Therefore, a sudden stop in capital ￿ ows, triggered by a negative shock to expected future
output, can create a debt crisis with widespread default. Consider the implications of the
same type of sudden stop for an exchange rate crisis.
4.2 Exchange Rate Crisis
A sudden stop in capital ￿ ows can create an exchange rate crisis with or without default.
Agents anticipate that period-2 output will be substantially higher than period-1 output
since they will reap the rewards of the risky investment project in period 2. Therefore, to
smooth consumption, they want to borrow in period 1 against period-2 income. Additionally,
since they know that negative news about future output would tighten the constraint on
the amount they can borrow, they hold money as a hedge asset which can ￿nance period-1
consumption. When a sudden stop occurs, agents seek to smooth consumption by exchanging
34money for foreign exchange with which they can buy goods. We have assumed that the
government has committed to hold enough foreign exchange reserves to ￿x the exchange
rate in good states, so we consider the possibility of an exchange rate crisis only when agents
are constrained in period-1 debt.
An exchange rate crisis occurs in period 1 when agents want more consumption, at
the price level implied by the initial exchange rate and the constrained debt level, than is
available in equilibrium. Exchange rate overshooting, in which the exchange rate in period
1 exceeds its value in period 2, convinces them to postpone consumption. Equilibrium in a
currency crisis requires an increase in an intertemporal price, not a relative price, requiring
the exchange rate to overshoot.
To demonstrate how this occurs within the model, it is necessary to consider the deter-
minants of period-1 real money balances when D1 is constrained by
￿￿HI
1+r .
Lemma 2 Optimal real money balances in period 1 for P1 = P0 are convex in ￿ with a
minimum at ￿d:
The proof, contained in the appendix, is based on the ￿rst order condition on period-1











For ￿ > ￿d; money demand is increasing in ￿ because an increase in ￿ raises equilibrium
consumption in both periods. For ￿ < ￿d, money demand is falling in ￿ because consumption
in period 1 no longer responds directly to ￿ since agents are in default. Therefore, for high
values of ￿ money demand falls as ￿ falls, reaching a minimum at ￿d and then rises as ￿
continues to fall.





at ￿d are less than ￿0; then
a currency crisis occurs over a range of values for ￿ given by ￿x < ￿d < ￿X; where ￿x and
￿Xare values of ￿ at which optimal real money equals ￿0: If optimal real money balances at
￿d are greater than or equal to ￿0; then a currency crisis cannot occur.
Proof. Using equation (13), foreign exchange reserves in period 1 depend on the quantity




￿ ￿0 ￿ 0: (28)
Foreign exchange reserves cannot be negative. Therefore, ￿0 acts as a lower bound on real
money balances. When equation (21) implies a value of
M1
P0 ￿ ￿0; there is no exchange rate
crisis. Otherwise,
M1
P0 must take on the value of its lower bound, and
P1
P0 solves equation (21)
with
M1














Therefore, if an exchange rate crisis is possible, then as ￿ falls from one, an exchange rate
crisis must occur for values of ￿ ￿ ￿d. As ￿ continues to fall from ￿d; real money demand is
rising, implying that a currency crisis occurs for values of ￿ < ￿d until ￿ has fallen enough
to restore money demand to ￿0:
Corollary 1 When a currency crisis is possible, depreciation is concave in ￿ with a maxi-
mum at ￿d:
The proof is contained in the appendix. Intuitively, once period-1 foreign exchange
reserves (F1) reach zero, period-1 nominal money balances can no longer fall, and the ability
to transfer consumption across time has been eliminated. Instead, relative prices must adjust
to satisfy the ￿rst order condition on period-1 real money balances given by equation (21).
36Depreciation increases the relative price of current compared to future goods, convincing
agents to postpone consumption. Since real money demand reaches a minimum at ￿ = ￿d;
prices must reach a maximum.
5 Government Policy
The government a⁄ects both the probability of an exchange rate crisis and the magnitude
of depreciation in a crisis with its choice of a value for initial transfers, ￿0:
Proposition 5 In an economy with a non-zero probability of default at ￿0 = 0; there is
a critical value of initial transfers given by ￿x
0; below which an exchange rate crisis is not
possible and above which an exchange rate crisis is possible. For ￿0 ￿ ￿x
0; both the probability
of an exchange rate crisis and the magnitude of depreciation in an exchange rate crisis are
increasing in ￿0:
The proof is in the appendix. It relies on the fact that an increase in initial transfers
reduces initial foreign exchange reserves, increasing the probability that there will not be
enough reserves to allow consumers to smooth consumption.
Proposition 5 implies that an increase in ￿0 can raise the probability of a currency crisis
while Proposition 2 implies that an increase in ￿0 can eliminate default risk if Y is near the
critical value for graduating into the safe credit club.18 Therefore, there can be a trade-o⁄
in the risk of a debt crisis and the risk of a currency crisis.
Corollary 2 A currency board sets ￿0 = 0; implying that a productivity shock, which triggers
a sudden stop of capital ￿ows, cannot create a currency crisis.
Proof. From equation (28), ￿0 = 0 implies that foreign exchange is fully backed by money
at the designated exchange rate, the de￿nition of a currency board. Since money demand is
18When the economy is far from the safe equilibrium, then the increase in ￿0; necessary to yield the safe
equilibrium, would not be feasible, given the government￿ s assumed commitment to maintain ￿xed exchange
rates in good states.
37always positive, foreign exchange reserves are always positive, and a currency crisis cannot
occur.
The government￿ s decision to maintain a ￿xed exchange rate system allows foreign ex-
change reserves to serve as a hedge asset in the event of default.
Proposition 6 Reserves provide insurance for the country, increasing present-value re-
sources for states in which aggregate income is low and the country is in default, at the
cost of fewer resources in states in which income is high and the country chooses to repay.
Proof. From Proposition 1, when ￿ is high (low) agents repay (default) in period 1. Period-
2 gross income is given by ￿HI + (1 ￿ ￿)LI; which is increasing in ￿: Therefore, agents
default in low-income states and repay in high-income states. Equation (30) in the appendix
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where ￿ 2 f0;1g is chosen to maximize the term in brackets. Foreign exchange reserves a⁄ect
the present-value of the country￿ s resources, conditional on realizations for ￿: With high ￿
and debt repayment (￿ = 1), foreign exchange reserves represent a net cost, since r0 > r,
whereas with low ￿ and default (￿ = 0), they represent a net gain of resources.
Note that net resources are reduced due to credit market imperfections, which require
creditors to pay the costly-state-veri￿cation fee, equal to ￿LI, before they can obtain com-
pensation after an agent defaults.
386 Conclusion
Investment necessary for growth and development in an emerging market is risky and takes
time. When an emerging market country has little wealth relative to the size of its investment
project, it must access international ￿nancial markets if it chooses to invest. A sudden stop
in capital ￿ ows, caused by a negative productivity shock in the presence of capital market
imperfections can magnify a solvency crisis, in which there is a relatively large number of
less-productive agents who default, into a widespread liquidity crisis, in which all agents
default. The negative productivity shock and associated sudden stop can also trigger a
currency crisis.
This model ￿lls a gap in the literature on emerging market ￿nancial crises by explicitly
considering the possibility that a ￿nancial crisis can be generated by the same fundamentals
responsible for business cycles, productivity shocks. A relatively low number of productive
projects is considered a negative productivity shock. When agents must borrow to engage
in risky investment, and when information on output is subject to costly state veri￿cation,
creditors impose ceilings on loans to assure that agents with high productivity prefer re-
payment to default with the surrender of a bankruptcy penalty. However, agents with low
productivity always default, and a low number of productive agents implies both low aggre-
gate output and a larger than average number of defaults. Additionally, when there is also
mismatch between the maturities for loans and investment, credit ceiling on new loans will
be determined after creditors receive a signal about the number of productive agents. When
this signal indicates a low number, interest rates are high and loan ceilings are low, implying
39a sudden stop of capital ￿ ows. A large enough sudden stop of capital creates default, because
agents lose less with default than with repayment. Additionally, the sudden stop of capital
forces agents to use money to support consumption. They swap money for foreign exchange
and use the foreign exchange to buy goods. If the monetary authority has su¢ cient reserves
to satisfy demand at the current price level, then there is no currency crisis. If not, the
exchange rate depreciates, overshooting to raise the relative price of current goods compared
to future goods, thereby convincing agents to postpone consumption.
The model also demonstrates that the world can be divided into three credit clubs, those
with no access, those with stable access at low interest rates, and those with volatile access at
interest rates re￿ ecting risk. Countries with very little wealth or very weak capital markets
have no access to international credit. Countries with high wealth and strong credit markets
enjoy high credit ceilings relative to their needs to borrow. For these countries, desired debt
at the risk-free interest rate is so low that agents always prefer repayment to sacri￿cing
the large fraction of output implied by the strong credit market. These are the advanced
economies who have stable access to international credit at low interest rates. Countries
in between, those with some wealth and a reasonably strong credit market, are driven to
the risky credit club. This occurs because debt desired at the risk-free interest rate is high
enough that agents prefer default to repayment in some states. Money demand is increasing
in the number of states requiring default since additional money allows a one-for-one increase
in consumption in bad states at the cost of reduction in consumption in good states equal
to the interest rate. Therefore, once debt is high to elicit default in some states, marginal
40bene￿ts of money exceed marginal costs driving agents to acquire the maximum amount of
money and debt. This drives these countries to the risky club with volatile credit access.
The model highlights the role of reserves as insurance. Although government policy is
not responsible for the productivity shock generating the crisis, its reserve policy a⁄ects
the economy￿ s response to the shock. Reserves have the role of insurance, transferring
resources to the country in times of default when output is low, at the cost of a default-risk
premium paid on loans when output is high. In default, the capital account shuts down,
and agents use reserves in their Bretton Woods era function to ￿nance a temporary current
account imbalance, thereby sustaining consumption. When reserves are insu¢ cient to satisfy
consumption-demand with ￿xed exchange rates, exchange rate overshooting convinces agents
to postpone consumption. Therefore, a large enough quantity of reserves can prevent a
sudden stop from becoming an exchange rate crisis. Additionally, if the country is near
the threshold for graduating into the safe country club, then a small reduction in reserves,
created by increasing initial transfers (￿0) allows graduation, by reducing the demand for
initial loans, possibly at the cost of increasing the probability of a currency crisis.
The model can be used to explain ￿nancial crises with origins in the private sector.
The 1997 Asian ￿nancial crises are often viewed as private debt crises, which also produced
currency crises. Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) present evidence to show that just
prior to the 1997 ￿nancial crises in the Southeast Asian countries, bankruptcies and non-
performing loans were high, both evidence of some degree of default on the part of private
agents. The crises brought more default with closures of banks and ￿nance companies.
41Large estimates of the ￿scal costs of restoring solvency to the ￿nancial sector after these
crises, presented by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebello (2001), is further evidence of private
default and debt rescheduling. Additionally, these countries experienced capital ￿ ight and
most devalued their currency. None of them experienced sovereign default. This model
formally endogenizes the sudden stop of international credit which is often viewed as the
cause of the debt and currency crises. News about bankruptcies could be interpreted as
reducing expectations for future output, triggering the sudden stop in capital ￿ ows. The
model also explains the associated currency crises in countries which did not have a currency
board, and the absence of a currency crisis in Hong Kong, a country with a currency board.
427 Appendix
7.1 Equilibrium Values
Some proofs and other results require solution for equilibrium values of consumption as a





and equivalently for debt (D0).
Combining agent budget constraints, given by equations (14) and (19), using equation
(3) for the equilibrium period-1 interest rate and government ￿ ow budget constraints, given




= Y1 ￿ ￿(1 + r0)D0 + (1 + r)F0 +




where ￿ 2 f0;1g.
When agents are unconstrained in the amounts they can borrow in period 1,
￿
D1 < ￿ D1
￿
;
they choose to repay, such that ￿ = 1: The ￿rst order equation on consumption implies that
agents achieve complete consumption-smoothing. Substituting F0 =
M0
P0 ￿ ￿0 = D0 ￿ I + Y
yields the value for equilibrium consumption as
c1 = c2 =
￿HI + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)LI + (1 + r)[Y1 ￿ (r0 ￿ r)D0 + (1 + r)(Y ￿ I)]
2 + r
: (31)
The equilibrium value of period-1 debt is given by
D1 =
[￿HI + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)LI](r + ￿) ￿ [Y1 + (1 + r)F0][r ￿ ￿(1 + r)]
r(2 + r)
; (32)
and parameter are assumed to take values such that D1 > 0:.
When agents are constrained in the amount they can borrow in period 1
￿










￿ (1 + r0)D0
￿














where ￿ 2 f0;1g is chosen to maximize utility and therefore c1: The value for
M1
P0 satis￿es
equation (21), subject to
M1
P0 ￿ ￿0. Note that the magnitude of exchange rate depreciation
itself does not a⁄ect consumption in equilibrium because there are no agents with whom to
trade goods for money in the event that foreign exchange reserves are exhausted. Exchange
rate depreciation must be large enough to convince agents to postpone consumption.




dm0 = 1: Therefore, when period-1 debt is con-
strained,
dc1
dm0 = 1 + r ￿ ￿ (1 + r0) ￿ 1
P0
dM1
dm0 ￿ 1 + r ￿ ￿ (1 + r0); since
dM1
dm0 is very small
when c1 is constrained. When agents fail to repay, ￿ = 0; and the e⁄ect of an increase in
initial money balances on c1 is positive and much larger because agents can use the resulting
increase in foreign exchange reserves with interest to ￿nance consumption. When period-1





7.2 Marginal Cost Falling in m0
The derivative of the net marginal cost of money (equation 26) with respect to m0; for
D0 ￿ DR





























where ~ c1 equals c1 evaluated at ￿ = ￿d.
44Substituting values above for
@c1
@m0 in di⁄erent states yields an upper bound on the deriv-


























Substituting equation (9) for
dr0







































c1f (￿)d￿ < 1




￿d has a reasonable lower support. Speci￿cally, if ￿ is uniform, a lower support exceeding
one-half is su¢ cient. Even in the worst state, it is reasonable to assume that more than
￿fty percent of ￿rms are successful. This implies that the term in curly brackets is negative
always. The ￿nal term is zero when D0 = DR
0 , such that
d￿d
dD0 > 0; but r0 = r and ￿d = ￿l:
Therefore, at D0 = DR
0 ; marginal cost falls as m0 increases. As money continues to increase,
the ￿nal term becomes positive. However,
d￿d
dD0 is rising at an increasing rate in D0 such that
d￿d
dD0 ! 1 as D0 ! ￿ D0: Therefore, MC is falling at values of debt for which D0 = DR
0 and
for which D0 = ￿ D0:
































where A and B are negative and C is positive. For marginal cost to be rising at any point
would require C > ￿(A + B) For D0 near DR
0 ; C is small relative to ￿B, since the integral
for C includes relatively few states. As D0 increases, C becomes larger, but ￿A becomes
45larger at a rapidly increasing rate because it must reach in￿nity once D0 reaches ￿ D0: Ex-
perimentation with numerical values assuming a uniform distribution always yields marginal
costs which fall at an increasing rate.
7.3 Assumptions on Magnitudes
In equilibrium, the expected utility from the risky project can be computed by taking the











￿HI + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)LI
1 + r








For agents to choose the risky investment project, the expected present-value of consumption,
given above, must be enough larger than resources from the single-period project with default
[(1 ￿ ￿)Y s
1 ] and from the single-period project with repayment [Y s
1 ￿ (1 + r)(I ￿ Y )] to
compensate agents for risk.
The assumption that the endogenous debt ceiling, given by
￿￿HI
1+r ; increases more rapidly
in ￿ than the desired level of debt, given by equation (32), requires that the derivative of
equation (32) with respect to ￿, given by
[HI￿(1￿￿)LI](r+￿)
r(2+r) ; exceed the derivative of the debt
ceiling with respect to ￿, given by
￿HI
1+r: Solving the inequality for ￿ yields
￿ >
(HI ￿ LI)(1 + r)(r + ￿)
(HI ￿ LI)(1 + r)(r + ￿) + HI(r ￿ ￿(1 + r))
: (35)
For the value of ￿ satisfying equation (35) to be less than one, ￿ < r
1+r; as assumed.
We con￿rm that l￿agents optimally choose default in period 2. When period-1 debt
is unconstrained, equations (32) together with the inequality in equation (35), imply that
46(1 + r1)D1 > ￿LI: When period-1 debt is constrained, the cost of the bankruptcy settlement,
￿LI; is less than interest and debt at the debt ceiling for a total of ￿HI.
7.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let D1 = ￿ D1 =
￿￿HI
1+r . Di⁄erentiation of equation (27) with respect to ￿; using





























When ￿ = 1, the Euler equation with c2 > c1 together with equation (35), which requires
￿ >
(HI ￿ LI)(1 + r)(r + ￿)





imply a positive derivative. When ￿ = 0, the derivative is negative. Therefore, real money
is increasing in ￿ for ￿ > ￿d and decreasing in ￿ for ￿ < ￿d; reaching a minimum at ￿ = ￿d:
7.5 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Setting
M1
P0 = ￿0 in equation (21) yields equation (29). Totally di⁄erentiating with
respect to
P1









P0 (1 + r)
￿
￿￿HIc2






For ￿ > ￿d, ￿ = 1; and the derivative is negative. For ￿ < ￿d, ￿ = 0; and the derivative is
positive. Therefore,
P1
P0 is decreasing in ￿ for ￿ > ￿d and increasing in ￿ for ￿ < ￿d; reaching
a maximum at ￿ = ￿d:
477.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. When there is a non-zero probability of default, D0 takes on its upper bound value.
This ￿xes the value of initial foreign exchange reserves, F0: For ￿0 = 0, an exchange rate
crisis is not possible because money always exceeds zero since it enters the utility function
directly. Equation (13) implies that with ￿0 = 0; F1 =
M1
P0 > 0: With F0 ￿xed, an increase in
￿0 creates an equal increase in
M0
P0 from equation (10). Di⁄erentiating equation (27), using
































With foreign exchange reserves in period 1 falling as ￿0 increases, there will be a value of ￿0,
given by ￿x
0; at which F1
￿
￿d￿
= 0: Further increases in ￿0 imply further decreases in money
demand and imply that money demand falls to ￿0 at larger values of ￿: Therefore, the largest
value of ￿ which would elicit a currency crisis, ￿x; is increasing in ￿0. By Corollary 1, the
magnitude of depreciation is increasing in ￿0 for a given realization of ￿: The government
a⁄ects both the probability of an exchange rate crisis and the magnitude of depreciation in
a crisis with its choice of a value for initial transfers, ￿0:
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